Can Weak Manchin Permitting Bill Be Strengthened?

After authorizing $370 billion in new funding for new, cleaner energy sources, Congress is turning to permitting reform: All the money in the world will not help if projects don’t have permission to build. Wednesday evening, Senator Manchin released proposed text for his permitting bill, which he apparently negotiated in return for his vote to authorize the energy funding. Unfortunately, the bill is not well-designed to speed up construction of new energy sources. But with a few strategic additions it could go a long way toward speeding up permitting to secure a cleaner, more reliable, and affordable energy future for the United States.

The biggest roadblock to energy sources is not financial; it is receiving permission to build. And many of the projects that we most need for a clean energy transition face particular permitting difficulties because they need permits from multiple states or local communities and the federal government. Our traditional energy commodities, oil and coal, are less dependent on building long-distance infrastructure because they can rely on existing railroads and pipelines, and they are easier to ship by multiple pathways using rail, road, and water transport. By contrast, cleaner energy products such as renewable electricity, natural gas, and hydrogen can only be shipped by new long-distance infrastructure.

Think of a long-distance power-line designed to bring renewable energy to market, a pipeline shipping natural gas to communities hoping to move away from coal, or a hydrogen pipeline designed to help replace fossil fuels. These linear infrastructure projects often need approvals from each state they cross and may also need approval from the federal government as well whenever they cross federal lands, borders, or streams.

There are two huge legal permitting challenges for these new cleaner energy projects.

So if we want to clean up our energy system and address the global energy crisis, which is causing energy shortages and price spikes around the globe, we need to speed up permitting. If the $370 billion authorized by Congress just goes to the few projects that would already have passed the permitting gauntlet, it will be money wasted. So we’ve seen a growing chorus of voices demanding reform to the permitting process to ensure this money isn’t squandered and that we can build a cleaner energy future.

The federal and state permitting challenges are linked because perhaps the most common proposal to speed permitting is to replace state and local siting processes with federal processes. For example, in 2005, the U.S. Congress gave the federal Department of Energy the power to designate areas that particularly needed more electricity transmission and gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission power to, in some circumstances, permit power-lines that hadn’t been approved by the states in those areas. Senator Manchin’s bill leans heavily on this method of speeding permitting: it gives federal government more power over permitting new power-lines and hydrogen pipelines.

The problem is that this is not an improvement at all when federally-approved projects are facing Kafkaesque challenges when they seek approval to actually build their projects. The energy sector where federal permitting is most common is in interstate natural gas permitting and these projects are routinely stopped by local objections even when they have federal approval. In fact, the two highest-profile recent gas pipeline projects—the Atlantic Coast Pipeline and the PennEast Pipeline—eventually had to give up on building their projects after years of expense and struggle, even though the federal government repeatedly backed both pipelines and both pipelines won blockbuster decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court.

If the Manchin bill passes as is, the gas pipeline industry can welcome the power-line and hydrogen industries to national regulation with this unwelcome news: “Even if the federal government backs you on every permit, and even if the Supreme Court backs you in every decision, no matter how long you wait, or how much you spend, states and lower courts will make life so difficult that your proposed project will never be built.”

The dysfunctions of federal permitting under court review are well known in energy policy. Congress’s 2005 grant of power to the Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was eviscerated by two federal appeals court decisions over the next six years. This is why the single project that really will be helped by the current Manchin proposal is the Mountain Valley Pipeline. The bill makes special provision for this project, directing that all actions “necessary for the construction and initial operation at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline shall not be subject to judicial review.”

The Manchin bill does almost nothing to help other energy projects stop endless court demands for further environmental review. The bill does address some less important timing issues so it’s important to keep straight three kinds of time limits:

  1. Time limit for the federal government to complete environmental review. The proposal directs a two year limit for environmental review of major projects and a one year limit for minor projects. Unfortunately, such deadlines are unenforceable—the federal government routinely misses even the statutory deadlines it is trying to meet. The deadlines may even be counterproductive if they encourage courts to stop projects and order further reviews because of concern that review was rushed to meet an artificial deadline.
  2. Time limit for plaintiffs to challenge a project after it receives its permit. This kind of “statute of limitations” is not harmful but of very little use. Smart plaintiffs hoping to stop infrastructure generally sue at the earliest opportunity because the best chance to stop an infrastructure project is before construction begins. So big projects are almost never held up by plaintiffs that waited years after the project was approved to bring their lawsuit.
  3. Time limit for courts to order more review on projects that have already been under review for years. Unfortunately, the Manchin proposal does not put any time limits on courts’ ability to hold up nationally-approved projects other than the Mountain Valley Pipeline. The federal environmental review law, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), is a procedural statute simply intended to ensure the government did sufficient environmental review of a project. If the federal government has been reviewing the environmental consequences of a project for years and has approved it, and the court would still like more review, the court can order the government to do more review. But it is not reasonable to make a nationally-approved project, and all the consumers and producers that depend upon it, wait for the court and government to reach agreement on how much environmental review is enough.

The crucial importance of a time limit on judicial delay of projects is well explained in the Institute for Progress’s excellent recent report on “How to Stop Environmental Review from Harming the Environment“:

The time limit that would likely have a major impact on outcomes is restricting the ability of the courts to issue injunctions against projects that have undergone extensive environmental review under NEPA. This change would provide developers the certainty they need to invest in large-scale build outs of solar, wind, transmission and other clean energy infrastructure. Without a time limit on judicial injunctions, developers have a sword of Damocles perpetually hanging over their head, threatening the entirety of the project.

As it stands, the Manchin permitting proposal would be a serious lost opportunity that would be unlikely to significantly speed up construction of new energy projects. The focus on federalizing review of clean energy projects is particularly unhelpful when the proposal doesn’t address the problems that are making federal review the bane of energy project developers.

The good news is that the Manchin proposal could be improved relatively simply if it added limits on federal court and state delays on federal projects. Speeding up permits for nationally-approved projects would accelerate construction of all the new energy projects that it designates for federal review.

Guest Post: Electric Grid Failures are not Grist for Partisan Fights

By David Spence

Transmission towers above snowy Katy Trail in Dallas, Texas (Feb. 2021)

Last summer California and Texas experienced almost simultaneous periods of very high electricity demand, triggered by hot weather. The California system struggled, experiencing several days of rolling blackouts; the Texas system did not. Characteristically, Texas Republicans (Ted Cruz among them) taunted California on social media, blaming renewable energy and over-regulation in the California market.

But what goes around comes around. This week the Texas’ grid failed in the face of an extended system-wide cold snap that froze power plant equipment and disrupted fuel supplies. No generation technology was left unaffected, but the bulk of the missing generation was natural gas-fired. That gave some on the left a chance to point the finger at fossil fuels and the less regulated Texas market design.

But neither crisis represents a fatal flaw in any particular electric generation technology, or either state’s market design.

As an initial matter, this is not about “privatization.” Most of the generators and sellers of power in Texas, California and elsewhere are privately owned and always have been.

It is true that the Texas market is lightly regulated, with easy market entry and access to transmission (but more price risk) for generators. There is competition and market pricing in both wholesale and retail markets. It is the only market in the country that depends almost exclusively on free-floating wholesale power prices to incentivize investment in new power plants. (Observers have long argued about whether that is enough of an incentive.) The state has no meaningful renewable energy or climate goals, but has nevertheless experienced massive investment in wind generation, giving Texas more wind capacity than any other state. The future promises a similar investment boom in solar generation. Retail power prices are low.

California, having suffered a breakdown in its competitive wholesale power market 20 years ago, is understandably wary of unrestrained competition. Its market has some competitive features but tighter controls designed to ensure both reliability and a cleaner energy mix. A spate of state climate and clean energy laws have led to the construction of more solar generating capacity and battery storage than any other state, and lots of wind too. Retail power prices are high, but most Californians don’t seem to mind.

And despite Texas’ lack of a climate policy, some proponents of a transition to a low carbon future actually like many aspects of the Texas market design.

Price competition and easy market entry benefit wind and solar plants because they are the least expensive forms of electricity generation. And some like that the Texas market rules allow wholesale prices to rise far higher during times of scarcity than they can in other markets, because that incentivizes conservation and demand reduction.

In competitive electricity markets in the northeastern United States (unlike Texas) some generators can qualify to be paid to be available as reserve power in the future. Some proponents of a green energy transition don’t like these “capacity payments” because they tend to go to coal- and gas-fired power plants.

So light-handed regulation has some unintended climate pluses. 

On the other hand, Texas owes its wind boom in part to a big departure from free market orthodoxy. It decided in 2005 to build new transmission lines connecting windy west Texas to cities in the east, spreading the cost of the lines across the entire customer base. Texas was able to socialize transmission costs that way because its grid is sealed off from the two big interstate grids that cover the rest of the lower 48 states. That isolation avoids federal regulatory jurisdiction, which arguably prohibits that approach to transmission financing elsewhere.

It is true that some of these features of the Texas market have led to lower generation reserves than the rest of the country. Experts have long debated whether that feature will trigger more outages in the future. But that was not the culprit this time. Even if Texas had more generating reserves, those plants may have been incapacitated by the cold snap too.

Rather, it was mistaken judgments about insuring against a low probability disaster that led to this crisis, and those judgments concern reliability rules and standards, not the Texas electricity market design.

The isolation of the Texas grid did prevent Texas from accepting a helping hand from neighboring states. Texas politicians seem in denial about that, either peddling the “wind farms are to blame” lie or the debatable notion that independence and self-reliance are worth the price of crises like this one.

February 18 marked the fourth and final day of the power outage at our house in Austin, and we remain under a boil water advisory as of this writing. We were lucky to find temporary heated shelter. Others will suffer much more, and some will die.

But it is a waste of time to use grid failures like these as ammunition for online ideological or partisan battles. Recognize them for the tragic failures they are; but think of them also as learning opportunities that will help grid operators and managers of power markets do better next time.

That isn’t a dramatic lesson, but it is a better one.

Both Texas and California experienced grid failures, and both will learn and adapt. Climate change will bring more severe weather more often. That, and the rapid growth of renewable energy will pose challenges for grid managers. But regulators and grid operators will find a way to provide reliable and affordable electricity anyway, because consumers (read: voters) will demand it. 

Those solutions may not be the same solutions everywhere, but that is as it must be. One size has never fit all in the American electricity sector.

Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #27 – Kristen van de Biezenbos

This Thursday’s EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast episode features me talking with the University of Calgary Faculty of Law’s Kristen van de Biezenbos about her research on “Social License & Fossil Fuels.”

Kristen describes how the term “social license” has become so important in Canadian energy policy and shows the different ways it has been used and misused by provincial and federal politicians. Kristen explains the origins of the term and explains what she thinks it should mean: she argues that local communities should not have a veto over linear infrastructure such as pipelines and power-lines, but that they should have some buy-in through consultation and a share in some of the benefits of these projects.

This discussion explores Kristen’s recent paper, which was published in the McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law and is titled, “Rebirth of Social License.” 

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links: 
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Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #21 – Joshua Macey

This week’s EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast episode features Cornell’s Joshua Macey talking with David Spence about his research on “Renewables and Reliability in Competitive Wholesale Electricity Markets.”

In the interview, Joshua explains why electric power providers in competitive markets are relying more and more on capacity markets, which pay them just for being available to provide power, and less on energy markets, which pay them only when they are actually providing power. He critiques the way that interstate grid operators and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have implemented these capacity markets, arguing that current rules discriminate against renewable resources such as wind and solar power.

The discussion builds on Joshua’s forthcoming University of Pennsylvania Law Review article with Jackson Salovaara, “Rate Regulation Redux.”

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links: 
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Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #18 – Ari Peskoe

This Thursday’s EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast episode features Harvard Law School’s Ari Peskoe talking with David Spence about his research on “Reliability, Decarbonization & Federal-State Conflict Over Electricity Markets.”

Ari and David talk about restructured power markets and struggles over the extent of federal and state authority to ensure that there are enough power plants and that electricity remains reliable. And Ari explains his work on a brief of electricity law scholars that defended states’ authority to adopt “zero emissions credits” that support nuclear power.

This discussion also builds on Ari’s recent paper, which is titled, “Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets.”

As an aside, my favorite part of the podcast comes near the start, when David offers the funny-because-it’s-true observation that “Ari is a Twitter public servant” because he “provides a lot of public goods on Twitter.”

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links: 
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Guest Blog: Joshua Macey on “Rate Regulation Redux”

  • Guest blogger Joshua Macey is here to discuss his new paper on how electricity regulators and grid operators are responding to increased solar and wind power, and how their interventions raise old questions that were supposed to be resolved by electricity deregulation. You can also hear an Energy Tradeoffs interview with Joshua about his piece here.

In Rate Regulation Redux, forthcoming in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Jackson Salovaara and I consider whether the American system for compensating electric power generators can accommodate high levels of renewables. We find that the current market structure is ill-suited to a high-renewables world. Regulators and grid operators (grid operators are the utilities that manage the power grid), it seems, are aware of the challenges renewables pose. However, instead of developing a payment system that would preserve competition in the energy sector and allow renewables to enter the market, regulators have begun an ad hoc process of reregulation that raises rates, leads to excess capacity, and prevents renewables from competing with traditional energy sources.

For most of the twentieth century, FERC treated electricity as a natural monopoly. To ensure that suppliers met demand, regulators gave utilities exclusive franchises over their service territories and permitted them to charge rates sufficient to cover their costs. In exchange, generators agreed to provide electricity to customers in their territories and cap prices. For years, this system provided reliable electricity. Nonetheless, critics complained that it limited consumer choice, failed to promote innovation, rewarded utilities for overinvesting in supply, and reduced incentives to retire uneconomic generators.

In the 1990s, FERC began to encourage a “market-based” approach to promote competition and control costs. Under this “restructured” model, which has been adopted in two-thirds of the country, an independent grid operator determines demand for electricity, solicits bids from generators, and clears enough bids to meet demand. The grid operator clears bids starting with the lowest bid but ultimately pays every generator the price bid by the highest clearing bidder. In this system, generators bid at their marginal cost. If a generator bids below its marginal cost, it risks having to provide electricity even when it would lose money in doing so. Above-marginal cost bids risk failing to clear when it would be profitable for the generator to operate.

This system promotes competition and keeps short-run costs low, but it is ill-equipped to integrate significant volumes of renewables. Generators that are dispatched infrequently or operate on the margin cannot make a profit or recover their costs. These plants are known as “peaking plants” and operate a few times in a year when demand is high (often on the hottest days of the summer or the coldest days of the winter when Americans consume a lot of electricity). Without them, grid operators would not be able to meet peak demand.

In theory, peaking plants would be able to make enough money to operate. While generators bid their variable costs almost all of the time, that assumption does not apply to peaking plants that bid only when demand is high. In most circumstances, a generator risks losing out on profitable bids if it submits a bid above its marginal costs. Because peakers are the last plants to be dispatched, they do not need to worry that they will be outbid because there are no plants available to outbid them. They can therefore submit bids that significantly exceed their marginal costs. As a result, peaking plants can drive prices to levels that would allow them to recover their fixed costs and make a profit despite the fact that they operate only a few times a year

However, a system that relies entirely on energy markets can lead to rampant market manipulation and excessive price volatility. Peaking plants have market power. Because they are the last units dispatched, if they do not operate, there will not be enough electricity to meet demand (these incentives contributed to the California energy crisis in the beginning of the twenty-first century). Peaking plants can therefore drive prices to extremely high levels. To avoid these problems, every regulator in the United States sets a ceiling on its energy market’s clearing price.

Unfortunately, a system that imposes price caps on energy markets is ill-equipped to integrate significant volumes of renewables. Renewables have a different cost structure than other generators. While the marginal costs for most generators are above zero, wind and solar facilities have very low operating costs. As renewables provide an increasing percentage of electricity, they suppress revenues for all generators. Imagine if four generators had been providing electricity to a region. Two bid $20 MWh, one bid $40 MWh, and one bid $50 MWh. All four generators were paid $50 MWh. If, however, a solar plant replaces the $50 MWh generator and offers $0 MWh, it will reduce revenues for all generators. That is because it will drive out the $50 MWh generator, making the $40 MWh generator the clearing bid, which means that every generator would be paid $40 MWh.

The challenge with this system is that as renewables suppress prices, energy markets become increasingly reliant on price spikes to ensure that all generators receive sufficient revenue. But if regulators do not increase price caps, then energy prices will not increase enough during scarcity to allow generators to make enough money to continue to operate.

There are a few possible solutions to this problem. One would be to increase price caps, but no regulator (with the possible exception of Texas) has expressed a willingness to let spot market prices rise enough to allow generators to recover their costs. Regulators have been reluctant to allow prices to rise to extremely high levels out of fear that doing so would encourage market manipulation. 

Another option is to develop other markets that would ensure that crucial generators are able to survive. To date, most regulators seem inclined to adopt this approach. Unfortunately, the markets regulators are developing do not allow meaningful competition between energy sources and instead prevent renewables from competing with traditional generators. For example, grid operators in the east coast have begun to rely on capacity markets, which pay generators for being available to provide electricity instead of for actually providing electricity, to make sure that generators receive enough revenue to continue operating. The problem with this this system is that capacity markets do not actually reward generators for providing the services the grid needs. Not all electricity has the same value. Generators that can turn on and off quickly, that can provide electricity when it is most needed, and that provide electricity to areas that are resource-constrained should be rewarded for providing these services. Energy markets are uniquely effective because they reward generators that provide electricity where and when it is really needed. Capacity markets fail to do this. To make sure that the “right” generators are being compensated in capacity markets, some grid operators have taken steps to make it more difficult for some types of generators (often renewables and nuclear) to enter capacity markets.

Equally problematically, it is difficult for generators to exit the market once they clear a capacity markets. Generators that clear capacity markets commit to operating for a period of time (often three years). During that period, they are not permitted to exit the market unless they receive regulatory approval to do so. Thus, customers are often stuck paying for dirty electricity that is no longer necessary for the grid.

Worse still, grid operators have begun to rely on “reliability-must-run” (RMR) agreements to provide even more competition to the generators that are perceived to be critical to grid reliability. When capacity markets are not able to retain generators perceived to be critical to grid reliability, grid operators have simply bailed individual generators, and they have done so without any kind of competitive bidding procedure.

In our view, these interventions resurrect many of the principles of rate regulation. Under that approach, regulators gave generators a rate of return intended to make sure that the electricity companies would be able to meet all of a region’s electricity needs. In exchange, power companies provided service at agreed-upon rates. Today, regulators have begun identifying the generators that the grid needs, making sure those generators receive enough money to operate, and preventing them from retiring prematurely. Rather than rely on market forces to determine which generators operate, regulators shield preferred generators from competition in order to ensure that those generators are financially viable. And these generators are required to provide the services the grid needs.

A superior option, which we endorse in the paper, is to design a system based on long-term contracts that would impose penalties on generators that fail to perform as promised. Some of the problems with capacity markets are that they do not compensate generators that provide the services that the grid needs, they prevent generators from competing with each other, and they make it difficult for uneconomic and superfluous generators to exit the market.

Regulators and grid operators want to ensure that there is enough capacity to provide electricity to consumers throughout the year. A bidding process would allow utilities to purchase the electricity that they need. Utilities would have an incentive to keep cost down because doing so would allow them to lower their own costs. And, by penalizing generators that fail to provide services they agreed committed to, this approach would preserve short-term price signals that create incentives for generators to provide electricity where and when it is needed.

Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #2 – Alexandra Klass

Our next EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast features David Spence interviewing the University of Minnesota’s Alexandra Klass about her research on “Network Infrastructure: Permitting & Eminent Domain.”

They discuss permits for interstate power-lines, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and oil pipelines, focusing on two recent articles from Professor Klass: “Future Proofing Energy Transport Law” and  “Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation.” Near the end of the podcast, they discuss energy & eminent domain, the subject of my forthcoming Minnesota Law Review article with Professor Klass.

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links.

Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #1 – Pipelines & Power-Lines

Earlier this month, David Spence posted an introduction to our new project with Sharon Jacobs and Shelley WeltonEnergyTradeoffs.com. Our website will feature the work of researchers grappling with energy policy tradeoffs between reliability, affordability, and environmental performance as well as the other trade-offs associated with energy transitions.

The site includes interviews in which these researchers discuss their recent articles. We have already posted 27 of these conversations and will post more in the coming weeks. But if you prefer to digest interviews in podcast format, I will periodically post them.

To start, below is my discussion with David on my just published article: James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 Oh. St. L.J. 263 (2019). The interview is titled “The Difficulty of Siting Pipelines and Transmission Lines” and you can find it here. You can find the published article here: http://bit.ly/Pipelines-Power-Lines

David and I discuss why it’s become cheaper to produce oil, gas, & renewable power, and how that has shifted energy companies’ focus to energy transport: how to get these new energy sources to consumers at an affordable price. I explain that, at the same time, changing laws are making it harder to build pipelines & power-lines and offer my suggestions for legal reform.

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links: Apple | Google

Guest Blog: Energy Policy in the Age of Emergency Governance

By Sharon Jacobs & Ari Peskoe

We live in an age of governance by emergency. In February, President Trump declared a national emergency to build a wall on the southern border after lawmakers repeatedly denied his funding requests. Next, he declared a national economic emergency to prevent U.S. firms from doing business with the Chinese technology company Huawei. Most recently, he invoked a national emergency to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan without Congressional authorization.

These invocations are each significant. But they are also piecemeal, making them even more dangerous than a more comprehensive power grab. Each individual emergency declaration may appear justifiable, or at least insufficiently threatening to warrant dramatic response. Before long, however, we may find that the executive has come to rely on emergency invocation as a tool of governance in peacetime.

We fear that the electricity industry may be next in line for governance by emergency. Since early 2017, the Administration has sought to support certain unprofitable coal (and sometimes nuclear) power plants. The Administration’s justifications for bailing out decades-old power generators are a moving target, and have included reliability, a nebulous concept called “resilience,” and, most recently, national security.

Make no mistake: power system reliability is vitally important, and the electric system must be able to recover from both routine and extraordinary shocks. We do not deny that natural disasters and physical- or cyber-attacks are real threats. Our disagreement is with the Administration’s flirtation with statutory emergency authorities to remake the energy system.

In a jointly authored paper released today, we make two primary arguments. First, the electric power sector is not in crisis. Despite recent closures of coal-fired power plants, interstate power networks operate reliably, and the nation has more than enough generation capacity to meet demand.  A mix of federally regulated market rules and reliability standards, including standards related to physical and cyber security, as well as industry protocols and state oversight, keeps the system in balance.

Second, we argue that statutory emergency authority in the energy space is highly circumscribed. We look at four statutes: the Federal Power Act, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, the National Energy Act of 1978, and the Defense Production Act. With respect to the first three statutes, emergency authorities may only be invoked in the face of an actual threat to the grid. These statutes permit a narrow range of actions tied to the particular emergency, and their authorities terminate upon the emergency’s end (or, in some cases, sooner). The Defense Production Act enables government subsidy of private sector goods and services, but only where deemed critical to national defense.

One thing is clear: these statutes are not roving licenses to advantage particular types of generation. Over the past two years, the Trump Administration has attempted to invent a crisis in order to funnel support to ailing coal-fired generators. Its rationales are unrelated to the public interest and unsupported by the government’s own research. Most recently, Secretary Perry has suggested that multiple statutory authorities might be combined to achieve these ends. But as we explain in the paper, addition of these statutory authorities does not create anything greater than the sum of their parts.

Lawmakers, regulators, and industry actors are confronting genuine questions about adapting the power system to modern challenges, from introducing greater levels of renewable generation to mitigating climate impacts. These complex challenges are properly dealt with in the context of existing reliability frameworks and established stakeholder processes. They are not the sort of questions that lend themselves to effective resolution by reflexive reaction to imagined emergencies.

Eminent Domain for Exporting Energy?

Eminent domain is the controversial exception to the general rule that no one can take your land without your consent. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows the government to take your land for “public use” so long as it pays you fair compensation.

But what is a public use? Should pipelines and power-lines that help companies export energy to other states and countries count as a public use? Is it legitimate for states to let energy transport companies use eminent domain to serve the public in other states or countries?

This issue—”which public?”—is an increasing focus of litigation across the United States because many state laws and constitutions, like the federal constitution and federal laws, limit eminent domain to projects that serve a “public” purpose. At the same time, increasingly integrated North American energy markets mean that more and more electricity, oil, and gas are crossing state and national borders.

Just last Friday, the Iowa Supreme Court held that sending oil to neighboring states can count as a public use. But there is also a broad movement for a go-it-alone eminent domain policy, including court decisions in West Virginia and Kentucky that say out-of-state consumers don’t count as the “public.” And the D.C. Circuit is now considering a similar challenge to a natural gas pipeline that will allow some natural gas to be exported to Canada.

As I argue in this op-ed, it would have been a huge mistake for Iowa to adopt a go-it-alone eminent domain policy. Iowa has world-class wind power that will be most valuable if Iowa can export it to states like Illinois that have more people and less wind. A no-eminent-domain-for-export policy would have been terrible for Iowa.

More broadly, there are huge benefits from interstate and international energy trade. For decades, Canada has sent us affordable oil and cheap, clean hydropower. And states that have affordable oil and hydropower generally export to states that do not. If there was no eminent domain for export power-lines and pipelines, we all would be stuck paying more for dirtier energy.

And we need energy transport now more than ever. As I explain here, the U.S. is in the middle of three energy booms: history’s biggest oil rush plus more natural gas and more renewable power. Oil has many ways to get to market—pipeline, truck, rail, and boat—but natural gas and renewable power production depend on transport. Natural gas has environmental benefits if it can be piped to places that need to replace coal and oil. Solar and wind can provide cheap, clean energy if we build power-lines to take it to market. And new pipelines and power-lines would help American companies and landowners get more money for their gas and power. 

None of that will be possible, however, if go-it-alone state policies make it impossible to bring energy where it is needed. Landowners are rightly concerned about eminent domain and governments should reform the eminent domain process and offer more compensation to protect them as I suggest in my forthcoming Minn. L. Rev. article with Alexandra Klass. But ignoring interstate and international consumers is not a sensible reform and would cut off much of the promise of the new U.S. energy economy.

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