Making the Most of a New Era of American Energy

This year, the United States emerged from history’s biggest oil boom—this boom was more than an order of magnitude bigger than previous U.S. commodity booms and seven times bigger than the world’s biggest previous oil boom, which occurred in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.

As a result, even with the 2020 oil bust, the U.S. produces more oil than any other nation. In 2019, America produced 65% more oil than #2 Saudi Arabia. And the U.S. is also the world’s biggest producer of natural gas and may soon be the world’s biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas. America is at the dawn of a new era as the world’s #1 energy producer.

My new line of research shows that, to maximize the benefit from this new bounty, oil & gas regulators should slightly slow production. Counterintuitively, slower production will benefit oil & gas companies by marginally increasing their cash flow and significantly increasing the long-term expected value of their assets. And slower production will also limit the environmental downsides of oil & gas and maximize the environmental benefits of natural gas.

Slower production counterintuitively helps oil & gas companies for two reasons.

First, although no individual company wants its production slowed, if companies were allowed to freely negotiate with each other, they would agree to cut back production simultaneously because slower production means higher prices and higher profits. As Adam Smith put it, “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in some contrivance to raise prices.” Antitrust law forbids them to negotiate a production slow down, because we usually prefer lower consumer prices. But oil & gas prices have been so low following the boom, sometimes even negative, that gas is just being wasted—flared off at thousands of wells across Texas and North Dakota. Regulators can stop this waste, which just harms consumers, by cutting back oil production. Modest production limits would also raise prices enough to increase overall cash flow to oil & gas companies immediately.

Second, oil and gas is a long-term asset, oil and gas that is wasted today could be worth a lot in the future. American oil & gas law pushes companies to drill and pump oil more rapidly than they would like—the rule of capture, common lease terms, and covenants implied into leases by the courts all make companies drill for oil when they would rather wait. But it makes no sense to rush to produce natural gas that will simply be flared, or to flood the market with oil at rock-bottom prices, when companies could simply wait to drill until prices recover. Modest production limits would somewhat mitigate the common law’s tendency to push more oil production than a truly free market would provide.

I explain these theoretical reasons for oil & gas production limits in my forthcoming Cardozo Law Review article, State Energy Cartels. I show how oil & gas production limits are actually an idea that came from the United States, and its oil producing states, during the Great Depression. And I show that production limits also have potentially massive environmental benefits: slowing carbon emissions, boosting renewable energy, and creating a counter-intuitive coalition of oil producing countries with a powerful interest in slowing fossil fuel production.

My own state of Texas will have to be a leader in negotiating any new coalition of oil producers to impose production limits. Because of the new oil boom, Texas now produces more oil than 12 of the 13 nations that comprise the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The Railroad Commission, Texas’s oil and gas regulator, has coordinated oil production limits before, as I explain in this EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast. In the years before and after World War II, Texas alone produced one quarter of the world’s oil and the United States together produced two-thirds. During these years, American oil powered recovery from economic catastrophe, victory in World War II, and the post-war global economic expansion. Texas played a leading role in limiting year-by-year oil production—so much so that when Middle Eastern countries moved to the forefront of oil production and formed OPEC, they described it as “a kind of international Texas Railroad Commission.”

My newest article, published in the Oil, Gas, & Energy Law Journal, shows how the Texas Railroad Commission can reclaim its mantle as the world’s leading oil & gas regulator and take initial steps toward cooperation on restraining production. I propose that it start by phasing in modest cuts in natural gas production to stop economic flaring and marginally raise oil and gas prices.

As I explain in this new Houston Chronicle op-ed, the Commission can improve its data collection to fine-tune its phase-in of new gas limits to ensure they boost industry cash-flow. I explain the economic and environmental benefits of this proposal at greater length in this recent video presentation on why it is the best method of stopping flaring, which is also embedded below.

The United States and Texas find themselves again at the center of global energy production. It is high time for them to carefully consider how they will maximize the economic and environmental benefits of this new bounty.

Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #39: Hannah Wiseman

For this week’s EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast interview, we have David Spence interviewing my friend and co-author Hannah Wiseman, now at Penn State Law – University Park, about her research on “Balancing the Local Costs and Wider Benefits of Energy Development.”

Hannah and David discuss her research on how to address energy projects that have concentrated costs in local communities but broader benefits to the economy and energy system—such as natural gas fracking and solar and wind farms. At times, states have responded to local opposition by stripping communities of local control over energy development, but that can leave important externalities unregulated. Hannah suggests that taxation might be a better way to address these externalities.

Hannah has a forthcoming paper titled “Taxing Local Energy Externalities” forthcoming in the Notre Dame Law Review. And along with Tara Righetti, we have just published a paper in the Yale Law Journal Forum on “The New Oil & Gas Governance.” Hannah also cites Kristen van de Biezenbos‘s important argument on oil company negotiations with local communities, “Contracted Fracking.

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links: Apple | Google

Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #38 – Caroline Cecot

In this Thursday’s EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast episode, I talk with Caroline Cecot of GMU’s Scalia Law School about her research on “Regulating the Risks of Fracking to Water.”

Caroline describes her empirical research on how New York towns approached fracking in the years before it was banned across the State. She finds that towns that were more vulnerable to water pollution and those that were less accustomed to oil and gas development were more likely to ban fracking. As a result, she argues that fracking might win more widespread support if better water contamination regulation could assure local communities of its safety. She also describes some of her ideas for improving insurance and regulation of fracking risks to water.

The discussion builds on two of Caroline’s recent articles: “Regulatory Fracture Plugging: Managing Risks to Water from Shale Development,” which was published in the Texas A&M Law Review in 2018, and “No Fracking Way: An Empirical Investigation of Local Shale Development Bans in New York,”which was published in Environmental Law in 2019.

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links: 
Apple | Google

Energy Tradeoffs Podcast #19 – Daniel Raimi

Our new EnergyTradeoffs.com podcast episode features Resources for the Future’s Daniel Raimi talking with David Spence about his research on “Fossil Fuels and the Risk Profile of Fracking.”

Daniel talks about his recent book, which evaluates common concerns about fracking, including polluted water supplies, diesel emissions, increased risks of earthquakes, and greenhouse gas emissions. Daniel explains how recent studies support or do not support these concerns. Daniel also explains how these risks can be addressed, noting how shale gas can be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in some circumstance but can raise emissions in other circumstances.

Daniel’s 2018 book is titled “The Fracking Debate: The Risks, Benefits, and Uncertainties of the Shale Revolution.” The interview also builds on Daniel’s 2019 paper on “The Greenhouse Gas Impacts of Increased US Oil and Gas Production.”

The Energy Tradeoffs Podcast can be found at the following links: 
Apple | Google

History’s Biggest Oil Boom: “The Third Age Of Oil & Gas Law”

The oil boom happening now in Texas is the biggest commodity boom the world has ever seen. We all know the stories of history’s oil and gold rushes—the heroes and villains, fortunes made and lost. But this boom dwarfs every previous commodity boom.

I’ve just posted my new Indiana Law Journal article, which shows how this new boom is transforming oil and gas law; it’s titled The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law. But it starts by explaining how oil and gas has always been the crucible and catalyst for the most important legal trends of the modern world: the transition from common law to regulatory state, the rise of private governance, and the shift to a multi- polar international order.

The article shows how modern oil and gas law was born on private land in the United States, explaining the economic logic of the oil and gas lease, which was the legal innovation that made the modern world possible. It shows how the center of gravity shifted overseas as the Middle East came to dominate oil production. Finally, the article concludes by showing how public and private landowners can ensure maximum benefit from the unprecedented oil boom now transforming the United States.

As you read the article, keep the following visualizations handy. The first shows how the oil and gas industry started in the United States, spread to Russia and the Middle East, and is now shifting back to the United States.

The second shows how the new boom has transformed the U.S. oil and gas industry, with new production concentrated in Texas.

Here are chart versions of those two visualizations, which focus on more recent years.

Here’s production by country since 1950.

Here’s production by state since 2005.

Here is the abstract for the article.

History’s biggest oil boom is happening right now, in the United States, ushering in the third age of oil and gas law. The first age of oil and gas law also began in the United States a century ago when landowners and oil companies developed the oil and gas lease. The lease made the modern oil and gas industry possible and soon spread as the model for development around the world. In the second age of oil and gas law, landowners and nations across the globe developed new legal agreements that improved upon the lease and won these resource owners a larger share of the benefits of oil and gas production. The third age of oil and gas law, which is now beginning, will be defined by three forces. First, fracking is transforming the common law doctrines that underlie oil and gas law and policy. Second, both private and public landowners are perfecting agreements that can win them a greater share of the oil and gas under their land. Third, public landowners are beginning to seek ways to balance their efforts to extract maximum value from their oil with their efforts to limit climate change.

This Article is the first to identify these ages of oil and gas law, which have been central to the development of law, the global economy, and the modern world. It also reveals the legal and economic logic of agreements between oil and gas companies and public and private landowners, and how they have evolved over the past century. And it describes how landowners can ensure maximum benefit from the unprecedented oil boom now transforming global oil production.

Cite as: James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law, 95 Ind. L.J. _, _ (forthcoming 2020) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367921.